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EX4 4PU  
 
 We investigate the terms of exchange between the legislative branch of the
government and an administrative bureau with standard operating procedures
(ABSOP). An administrative bureau is a not-for-proﬁt public organisation re-
sponsible for the production of a non-marketable good. Such a bureau is tax-
ﬁnanced and the budget appropriations can be linked directly to a veriﬁable
measure of the agency’s performance. Also, the tax-ﬁnanced transfer must not
be less than the monetary cost of running the public agency. When standard
operating procedures are central to the workings of the bureau, the agency is
unencumbered by moral hazard. Yet, such agency is likely to have superior
information over its production technology relative to the legislature. In such
an information environment, we focus on how the legislature could minimise its
welfare losses. Our results come in striking contrast to those in the literature
on bureaucracies and to the received adverse selection ﬁndings. In a setting
where the agency can be either of two cost-types, the principal ﬁnds it optimal
in most cases to distort the production performance of the bureau regardless of
its cost-type. Also the distortions are not of the same direction.
Eﬀectively, the problem we investigate here is a principal-agent problem with
hidden information, with the principal being identiﬁed with the legislature and
the agent being identiﬁed with an ABSOP. Such a problem, in its standard form,
has been used brieﬂy in discussing the design of bureaucracies. This paradigm
has also been used extensively in studies of procurement and regulation.
The main message of this paradigm is that the principal must leave rents
with the agent who has an incentive to mis-report his type, in order to prevent
him from doing so, and that these rents are decreasing with the production
undertaken by the agent who has no incentive to mis-report his private infor-
mation. Accordingly, the principal faces a trade-oﬀ between information rents
and output distortion. This trade-oﬀ leads to underproduction on the part of
the agent who has no incentive to deviate from truth-telling.
Nevertheless, in the standard version of this problem the principal is en-
cumbered only by an information and a voluntary-participation constraint. In
this paper, instead, we postulate, as we have already mentioned, that when an
administrative bureau is designed its political principal(s) are also restricted by
the constraint that the budget must be as low as the monetary production costs.
This constraint, in conjuction with the fact that the bureau’s manager may not
aim at proﬁt maximisation, implies that the legislature, when it contemplates
what incentive-compatible contract to oﬀer to the bureau, does not need to
worry that the agency will reject its oﬀer and hence that public output will
not be produced. The reason is that the administrative constraint the enacting
legislature faces is stricter than the agency’s participation constraint.
The fact that, due to the agency’s preferences, the administrative con-
straint makes redundant the voluntary-participation constraint implies that in
analysing the optimal mechanism vis-a-vis a not-for-proﬁt public agency which
produces a non-marketable good we end up with a non-standard adverse se-
lection problem. In more detail, the principal still faces a trade-oﬀ between
information rents and output distortion s ,a si ti st h ec a s ei nt h es t a n d a r dp a r -
adigm. Yet, in our case, information rents can be reduced by distorting the
1production undertaken by all types of the agent. The latter implies that, in a
two-types setting, we can ﬁnd instances where the low-cost agent undersupplies
and the high-cost agent oversupplies its output under the optimal revelation
mechanism, and cases where the reversed production scheme is implemented.
21I n t r o d u c t i o n
The understanding of the workings of the government and, in particular, the determination of govern-
ment policies requires the development of a theory of public administration - the executive branch of the
government. The ﬁrst big steps towards a theory of public agencies took place with Tullock (1965) and
Downs (1967). The ﬁrst formal model of bureaucracy is due to Niskanen (1971). More recent accounts
of public administration, which have deservedly established themselves in the economics and political
science, are Wilson (1989) and Horn (1995), to mention few.1
The starting point of a theory of public administration is that the legislative branch of the govern-
ment faces time and resource constraints that limit its ability to administer the enacted policies. These
limitations imply that the enacting legislature may have an incentive to delegate the administration
of government policies to public bureaus. Nevertheless, if the legislature has incomplete information
concerning the activities of the agency, delegation will give rise to agency slippage. That is, delegation
may suﬀer from the agency possessing private information over its endogenous choices. In addition,
a public bureau may be an ‘expert’ in providing certain services. In other words, because they have
more time or are more competent, government oﬃcials may have superior information, relative to the
legislature, about exogenous parameters which are pertinent to the administration of enacted policies.
In any case, the bureau’s (expected) output may not be the one preferred by the legislature.
Obviously, then, examining the determination of policies requires our understanding of what
public agencies do, and why they do it. Naturally, the enacting legislature ﬁnds itself at the centre of
such a theory. To mitigate agency shirking and/or the adverse selection problem, the Congress must
ensure that certain mechanisms to this eﬀect are in place. The incentives faced by bureaucrats, and
thereby what government agencies do, will largely depend on the particular form these mechanisms take.
What kind of restrictions bureaucrats face, on the other hand, and hence the reason why government
agencies do what they do, will depend on a number of factors. Such determinants, to mention few, are
w h ya g e n c i e sa r es e tu pi nt h eﬁrst place, how they are ﬁnanced, and the extend to which and by whom
their activities can be controlled.
The (modelling) possibilities are far from few, and thus so is the work that comprises the received
literature.2 This paper contributes to the further development of the theory of public administration
by investigating the eﬃciency properties of the workings of a certain class of public organisations. In
particular, we investigate the terms of exchange between the legislative branch of the government and an
Administrative Bureau with Standard Operating Pr o c e d u r e s( A B S O P ) .S o m ee x a m p l e so ft h i st y p eo f
public agencies are bureaus that administer (military) procurement and tax collection, transfer agencies
1Hereafter, we will interchange the words bureaucrat(s), (public) bureau, (public) agency, agent(s), bureau’s head and
agency’ head.
2For excellent reviews of the literature on public agencies see Moe (1997) and Wintrobe (1997).
3where most of expenditure is simply passing through - like agencies that administer pensions, and the
army during peacetime. We restrict our attention to the analysis of such agencies because they have not
been analysed by economic theory despite the fact that, on the one hand, they are clearly as important
as the rest of the public organisations and, on the other hand, this type of government bureaucracy
h a sf e a t u r e st h a td i ﬀer from standard models of procurement or other studies of bureaucracy and have
important and interesting eﬃciency consequences.
The ﬁrst deﬁning feature of an ABSOP is that it is characterised by inputs-monitoring. In
organisations with this characteristic, the actions of the employees are observable and there are processes
that pertain to the observable actions. That is, the political principal(s) of such an agency can determine
how allocations are related to certain standard operating procedures.3 For example, superiors can easily
verify if a tax-payer or pension-claimant has provided the agency’s employees with the right documents
and how many invoices have been processed in one day, and “the amount of the check is determined
by an elaborate but exact formula”.4 Or, in the case of the army during peacetime, “popular accounts
of service in the peacetime army ... are replete with stories about rules and procedures”,5 soldiers
act under the “direct gaze” of their superiors, every detail of training and equipment is under the
direct supervision of military oﬃcers, and the ability of the armed forces to deter enemy aggression
can be monitored by their superiors by means of military exercises. Finally, “what dominates the task
of the contract oﬃcer are the rules, the more than 1,200 pages of the Federal Acquisition Regulation
and Defence Acquisition Regulation in addition to the countless other pages in DoD directives”.6 In
short, moral hazard problems are very likely not to be a major concern on the part of an ABSOP’s
principal(s).7 Yet, ABSOPs, are not problems-free; they may still suﬀer from adverse selection. For
instance, civil servants in the Department of Defence often have superior knowledge on weapons systems
and how they enhance military capability. Similarly, civil servants responsible for processing tax invoices
and retirement beneﬁts have better information on whether more, advanced or in number, computers
will enable them to administer claims in a more eﬃcient way. In the words of Bendor et. al. (1985)
such a “bureau’s superior expertise is embodied in its” private information over the “relation between
intermediate and ﬁnal output”. Alternatively, as Horn (1995), pp 87, has documented, a public bureau’s
production technology and hence the true cost of production of public output will often not be veriﬁable.
3For discussions on process-monitoring in public organisations, see Wilson (1989), pp. 35, 133, 159-164, 202, 221, 244,
320-323, 375 Prendergast (2000) and Dixit (2000).
4Wilson (1989) pp. 35.
5Wilson (1989) pp. 164.
6Wilson (1989) pp. 321. In military procurement there is also an aditional reason why ‘bureaucratic drift’ migh not
be a concern: the manager of a military procurment program is a military oﬃcer, “which means he cares deeply about
having the best possible airplane, tank or submarine” for any given appropriation (Wilson (1989) pp. 321).
7See, for instance, Wilson (1989) pp. 174-175.
4Accordingly, even if the legislature succeeds in inducing the agency to take up recommended actions,
by means of inputs-monitoring, the agency will still have superior information over the true (monetary)
costs of running the department.
A natural question then is: How can such an administrative bureau be given incentives to reveal
its private information? The incentives faced by an ABSOP are partly shaped by its second deﬁning
characteristic: such an agency is set up in order to produce a non-marketable good (or service). This
feature of an ABSOP implies almost by deﬁnition that such bureaus are tax-ﬁnanced. Another implica-
tion is that such agencies are in general involved in producing goods with widely distributed beneﬁts and
costs. Accordingly, there is less incentive for private interests to monitor the agency or to participate
in agency decision-making.8 This implies that ‘ﬁre alarms’ are less likely to work, and special-interest
politics are less likely to be present in the case of administrative bureaus. In addition, the supply of such
goods is in general characterised by imperfect competition, and a public bureau is often the sole provider
of a given public output.9 Moreover, the nature of the good ‘sold’ by an administrative bureau implies
that the buyer of the agency’s ‘expertise’, i.e. the legislature, is very likely to be a monopsonist. In
other words, yardstick competition and implicit incentives in the form of career concerns are very likely
to have a limited scope in the extraction of the agency’s private information.10 The ﬁnal implication of
the feature in question is that the bilateral trade we focus on is restricted by the requirement that the
tax-ﬁnanced transfer from the legislature - or sponsor - to the agency must be as low as the monetary
cost of production of public output. This constraint, what we call hereafter administrative constraint,
follows naturally from the fact that ABSOPs produce non-marketable goods, and thus the only source
of ﬁnancing the cost of running such agencies is the budget appropriation.
The third deﬁning feature of an ABSOP is the veriﬁability (or contractibility) of its output.
That is, the legislature, can condition the budget appropriation on the agency’s output. An agency’s
output may diﬀer from its mandated goal. ABSOPs can in general be divided into production and
procedural organisations. The attainment of a production organisation’s mandated goal is veriﬁable.
For such an organisation, the output coincides with the mandated goal. Yet, in the case of procedural
agencies, the mandated goal is not veriﬁable. Instead, a veriﬁable measure of the agency’s intermediate
output, towards the attainment of its mandated goal, exists and this measure can be linked with the tax-
ﬁnanced budget the agency can appropriate. That is, a procedural organisation’s (intermediate) output
is its veriﬁable performance measure. Some examples of production agencies are tax administration
and pensions administration bureaus.11 For such agencies the mandated goal is to ‘process tax invoices
8See, also, Horn (1995) pp 79-82.
9See for instance Niskanen (1971) pp 24, Wilson (1989) pp 33, Horn (1995) pp 33 and Dixit (2000).
10See Horn (1995) pp 33.
11See Wilson (1989) pp. 35, 160-162, 244.
5and retirement beneﬁts accurately and speedily, given the available resources’. Obviously an agency’s
performance vis-a-vis such a goal is veriﬁable; for instance, accuracy can be measured by the number
of mistakes in processing tax invoices, and speediness can by measured with reference to a well-deﬁned
deadline like the end of the ﬁnancial year, for any given appropriations by the agency. Examples
of procedural organisations are bureaus that administer military procurement12 and the army during
peacetime.13 The mandated goal of these agencies is usually as vague and non-veriﬁable as to ‘build
up and maintain a military capability which is suﬃcient for the defence of the nation and the defeat of
enemies during a military escalation, given the available resources’. However, despite the ambiguities
inherent in such a mandated goal,14 it is quite natural to deﬁne as the (intermediate) output of such
agencies simply the number of infantry divisions, tanks, air-ﬁghters and so on. It is also quite hard to
imagine that a society will not reach an agreement that the higher the intermediate output is - for a
given budget allocated to the Department of Defence - the more likely it is that the mandated goal will
be attained. In addition, it is also obvious that the intermediate output of such an agency is veriﬁable
and can be linked directly to the resources allocated to the agency by the enacting legislature.15
The ﬁnal deﬁning characteristic of an ABSOP is that such an agency is a not-for-proﬁt organisa-
tion: proﬁts is not the legitimate goal of public bureaus. This feature, in conjuction with the non-market
nature of an ABSOP’s output, implies that a bureau’s manager may not pursue the goal of proﬁtm a x -
imisation.
In more detail, putting aside any managerial utility costs, any organisation is in general associated
with some measure of proﬁts. In addition, managers, in any sector, are in general unable to ‘pay
themselves’ all the proﬁts they create, in, say, the form of higher salaries. Therefore managers may
have nonpecuniary goals as well, like perquisites of oﬃce, public reputation, power and patronage.
One of the possible determinants of these beneﬁts is the size of the budget available to them, or in
general the size - according to some measure - of the ﬁrm. In fact, public reputation, power and
patronage are often perceived to be positively related to the size of the budget.16 Yet, this does not
imply that managers are budget-maximisers.17 The reason is that an organisation may also beneﬁt
12See Wilson (1989) pp. 320-323.
13See Wilson (1989) pp. 163-164, 202 and Dixit (2000).
14Clearly, it is diﬃcult to prove whether the existing military capability is suﬃcient to defeat an enemy prior to a
military engagement!
15The distinction we make here between an agency’s mandated goals and intermediate output, is essentialy very similar
to the distinction made in Wilson (1989) pp. 32-34 between a bureau’s ‘goals’ and ‘(critical) tasks’.
16See, for instance,Niskanen (1971) pp. 38.
17Empirical studies has shown that salaries and careers of bureaucrats are not signiﬁcantly related to the size of the
budget, Johnson and Libecap (1989), Young (1991). For a related criticism see also Breton and Wintrobe (1975) and
Wilson (1989) Ch. 7.
6from an increased discretionary budget: the diﬀerence between the budget and the minimum cost of
production.18 For instance, one could argue that the higher the discretionary budget the easier it
could be for an organisation to hire new staﬀ, and thereby reduce the existing workload, redecorate
oﬃces, and so on. Accordingly, managers may not always pursue either the goal of proﬁt maximisation
or the goal of budget maximisation; they may instead maximise a function of both the budget and
proﬁts/discretionary budget.19 This phenomenon, however, is more acute in public agencies. Possible
reasons for this are the following. On the one hand, proﬁts are not well deﬁned for administrative
bureaus due to the non-market nature of their ‘output’. Naturally this entails a diﬃculty on the part
of a public agency’s manager in appropriating pecuniary beneﬁts. On the other hand, even if there
is some veriﬁable measure of proﬁts, public agencies are in general non-proﬁt organisations and hence
any realised proﬁts are largely appropriated by their political overseers.20 Thus public managers have
an incentive to pursue non-pecuniary beneﬁts or ‘rents’.21 Accordingly, a bureau manager’s marginal
disutility of monetary production costs is likely to be lower than the marginal utility of the budget-
size/revenues on the part of bureaucrats,22 and any discussions on the eﬃciency of bureaucracies must
(at least partly) evolve around such a tenet.
Given the above characteristics of an ABSOP, in this paper we focus on how the enacting legis-
lature could minimise the eﬃciency losses which may result when agencies largely control information
pertinent to the exchange relation. This problem leads to very interesting results. In particular, in
a setting where the legislature is faced with an agency which can be either of two cost-types, we ﬁnd
that in most cases it is optimal for the principal to distort the production of the bureau regardless of
its cost-type. Also the distortions are not of the same direction. The intuition behind this result is
brieﬂy discussed at the end of the next Section, after having drawn the links of our work to the received
literature.
The organisation of the paper is as follows: Next Section discusses how our model is related to
other studies of bureaucracy and procurement. Section 3 presents the model. Section 4 solves for the
optimal contract oﬀered to the bureau. Our results are discussed and compared to the ones in the
received literature in Section 5. Section 6 investigates how results may change if the public agency can
attract resources only up to a certain level. Finally, Section 7 concludes and points to directions for
18See for instance Migue and Belanger (1975).
19The arguments here echo the ones found in Baumol (1962), Williamson (1964) pp.3 and Jensen and Meckling (1976),
to mention few. For an excellent discussion of related issues see also Tirole (1988) pp. 35-51.
20For a related discussion see also Wilson (1989) pp 113-120, 179-181, and Dixit (2000).
21An example of such practice can be found in “MoD civil servants rack up 315m bill on hotels” by Marie Woolf, The
Independent, Friday 28 June 2002.
22In fact this observation is used by Glaeser and Shleifer (1998) to demonstrate that a bureau’s manager will be less
tempted to cut a pound’s worth of quality than the manager of a for-proﬁt organisation.
7further research.
2 Related Literature
The ﬁrst deﬁning feature of an ABSOP is that it is free of moral hazard problems. The absence of such
problems is what diﬀerentiates an ABSOP from craft and coping organisations. For some discussions
on ‘bureaucratic drift’ and models of craft and coping organisations the reader can consult Weingast
(1984), Bendor et. al. (1987b), Wilson (1989), pp. 165-171, Tirole (1994), Horn (1995), pp. 79-80,
Dewatripont et. al. (1999), Prendergast (2000) and Dixit (2000).
The second deﬁning characteristic is that such an agency is set up in order to produce a non-
marketable good. Such a characteristic deﬁnes, according to Horn (1995), an administrative bureau.
This feature also diﬀerentiates our work from accounts of bureaus that are responsible for the allocation
of non-marketable assets or for the production of marketable goods. The allocation of non-marketable
assets deﬁnes, according to Horn (1995), a regulatory agency. Work on the issues that arise when such
public organisations are set up includes McCubbins (1985), McCubbins et.al. (1987, 1989), Calvert et.
al. (1989), Laﬀont and Tirole (1993, Chs 11 and 12), Prendergast (2000), Leaver (2001), Makris and
Kotsogiannis (2002). The production of marketable goods, on the other hand, deﬁnes, according to
Horn (1995), a state-owned enterprise. Accounts of such agencies are, among others, Laﬀont and Tirole
(1993, Ch 17), Tirole (1994), Hart et. al. (1997), Glaeser and Shleifer (1998) and Laﬀont (2000, Ch 5).
An implication of ABSOPs being responsible for the production of non-marketable goods is that
such agencies are in general involved in producing goods with widely distributed beneﬁts and costs.
This, however, is not the case for regulatory agencies. Private interests are more active in monitoring
a regulatory agency or in participating in regulatory decision-making. For a related discussion one can
visit Wilson (1989), pp. 75-79. Another implication of the feature in question is that the tax-ﬁnanced
transfer from the legislature to the agency must be as low as the monetary cost of production of public
output. In fact, this constraint is also part of the deﬁnition of an administrative bureau in Horn (1995),
pp. 81 and 90-91. Finally, we stress that yardstick competition and implicit incentives in the form
of career concerns are very likely to have a limited scope in the extraction of the agency’s private
information. The absence of yardstick competition and implicit incentives is not, however, a problem
for the political principal(s) of a regulatory agency and state-owned enterprise. For a more detailed
comparison of state-owned enterprises and administrative bureaus Horn (1995) pp 82, 170-172 and 180
is an excellent source. A more detailed comparison of regulatory agencies and administrative bureaus
can also be found in Horn (1995) pp 40-43 and 79-82.
ABSOPs can be thought of being the kind of public bureaus investigated in Niskanen (1971):
“Bureaucrats and their sponsors do not, in fact, talk much about output - in terms of military capability
... etc. Most of the review process consists of a discussion of the relation between budgets and activity
8levels, such as the number of infantry divisions... The relation between activity level and output is usually
left obscure and is sometimes consciously obscured ... The activities of a bureau, however, should be
recognised as intermediate services which are valuable only as a function of their eﬀectiveness” (pp.
26-27). Clearly, then, our approach can be considered as investigating the exchange relation which has
been the focus of the literature that originated from Niskanen (1971).
Notwithstanding, our approach bears a major diﬀerence with the methodology in the literature a-
la-Niskanen. In this paper we assign the power of authority to the legislature, with the implication that
the sponsor will design the bureau in a way that serves best her interests given the various constraints
she may encounter in doing so. In contrast, Niskanen (1971), Migue and Belanger (1975) and Bös
(2001), for instance, employ a budget-game which enables the bureau to extract the whole surplus on
the part of the legislature; the agency is in eﬀect a perfectly discriminating monopolist. Clearly, such
a budget-game would never be deployed by a legislature that has the political authority of choosing
the terms of its interaction with a public agency. Miller and Moe (1983), on the other hand, postulate
that the legislature can prohibit the agency from behaving as a perfectly discriminating monopolist.
Yet, their budget-game implies that the bureau can still make take-or-leave-it oﬀers of per-unit prices.
A branch of the literature that elaborates on the work of Niskanen (1971) investigates the eﬃciency
properties of the outcomes of various budget-games w h e nt h es p o n s o ri sa l s oe n d o w e dw i t ha na u d i t i n g
technology which can alleviate the asymmetry of information between a bureau and its sponsor. Some
indicative work along these lines is Breton and Wintrobe (1975), Bendor et. al. (1985, 1987a), Banks
(1989) and Banks and Weingast (1992). However, even in these papers, it is not clear whether the
political overseers of an agency could do better by enforcing an alternative budget-game.23
Our approach, that the sponsor will design the bureau optimally given the various constraints
she faces, is also somewhat related to the early theory of congressional dominance (see, for, instance,
Fiorina (1981), Barke and Riker (1982), Weingast and Moran (1983), Weingast (1984), McCubbins and
Scwartz (1984)). However, in that strand of research in political control, on the one hand, the focus is
on regulatory agencies and, on the other hand, the bureau and its informational advantage are given
short shrift. In a sense then this theory stands as the opposite polar case to that of Niskanen.
In other words, what diﬀerentiates our work from the literature a-la Niskanen and the theory of
congressional dominance is that we focus on how the enacting legislature could minimise the eﬃciency
losses which may result when agencies largely control information pertinent to the exchange relation.24
23This issue is examined in an accompanying paper of ours.
24The paradigm of the legislature having the political authority of choosing the terms of its interaction with a public
agency has been adopted by most of the literature on bureaucracies, including, for instance, Tirole (1994), Dewatripont
et. al. (1999), Dixit (2000) and Prendergast (2000). In contrast, Niskanen (1971), postulates that the agency due to its
‘expertise’ has complete bargaining power. Notwithstanding, the two sources of power are diﬀerent. Superior information
is rooted in the ‘expertise’ of the bureau, whilst the agenda control stems from political authority. Hence, these two
9In order to design the agency optimally, the legislature will need to condition the budget to the agency’s
output in a way that takes into account the hidden information problem it is faced with. The Revelation
Principle, then,25 tells us that the principal can without loss of generality focus on linking budget
appropriations and public output in an incentive-compatible way: that is, in a way that induces the
agency to reveal its private information. We should however note that the revelation principle raises
the question of commitment on the part of the sponsor. This follows from the fact that the principal
has an incentive to break the contract ex post and force the bureau to operate in an eﬃcient, from the
principal’s point of view, way. This is a consequence of the legislature possessing ex post the necessary
information to do so. If the sponsor cannot commit at a revelation contract when sets up the bureau,
then the revelation principle no longer holds. To enable the use of the revelation principle, this paper
presumes the existence of an external mechanism, like a court of law, which can enforce contracts.26 In
a sense, then, this paper examines the upper bound to the payoﬀ of the sponsor from being involved
in a principal-agent relationship with a public bureau, and the implications for the eﬃciency of the
bureaucracy.
Eﬀectively, the problem we investigate here is a principal-agent problem with hidden information,
with the principal being identiﬁed with the legislature and the agent being identiﬁed with an ABSOP.27
Such a problem, in its standard form, has also been used brieﬂy in Dixit (2000) in discussing the design of
bureaucracies. This paradigm has also been used extensively in studies of procurement and regulation.28
The main message of this paradigm is that the principal must leave rents with the agent who
has an incentive to mis-report his type, in order to prevent him from doing so, and that these rents
are decreasing with the production undertaken by the agent who has no incentive to mis-report his
private information. Accordingly, the principal faces a trade-oﬀ between information rents and output
sources need to be treated separately. See Miller and Moe (1983) and Moe (1997) for a related argument. Note here that
one can also justify the use of the principal-agent paradigm by observing that if the legislature left with the agency an
extra unit of the surplus involved in the exchange relationship in question it would then reduce, in eﬀect, the surplus on
the part of the electorate. This in turn implies that the prospects of the legislature retaining its decision-maker status
would largely be diminished. For a similar argument see Breton and Wintrobe (1975), Weingast (1984) and Casas-Pardo
and Puchades-Navarro (2001). Anyhow, nowadays researchers of bureaucracies agree, at large, that the sponsor is the
side which possesses monopoly agenda control (the sponsor holds political power and hence the legal right to tell public
agencies what to do) and agencies control information.
25For some excellent treatments of the related literature see Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) Ch. 7 and Mas-Colell et al.
(1995) Ch 23.
26It should be emphasised here that this is also the implicit assumption in the received literature.
27The implicit asumption here is that the public servants that comprise the ABSOP collude perfectly and hence can
be treated as a single entity. Disentangling the interactions within the agency and the implications for the design of the
organisation is a very interesting task but out of the scope of the current work, and is left for future research.
28See for instance Baron and Myerson (1982) and Laﬀont and Tirole (1993).
10distortion. This trade-oﬀ leads to underproduction on the part of the agent who has no incentive to
deviate from truth-telling.
Nevertheless, in the standard version of this problem the principal is encumbered only by an
information and a voluntary-participation constraint. In this paper, instead, we postulate, as we have
already mentioned, that when an administrative bureau is designed its political principal(s) are also
restricted by the constraint that the budget must be as low as the monetary production costs. This
constraint, in conjuction with the fact that the bureau’s manager may not aim at proﬁt maximisation,
implies that the legislature, when it contemplates what incentive-compatible contract to oﬀer to the
bureau, does not need to worry that the agency will reject its oﬀer and hence that public output will
not be produced. The reason is that the administrative constraint the enacting legislature faces is
stricter than the agency’s participation constraint.
The fact that, due to the agency’s preferences, the administrative constraint makes redundant
the voluntary-participation constraint implies that in analysing the optimal mechanism vis-a-vis a not-
for-proﬁt public agency which produces a non-marketable good we end up with a non-standard adverse
selection problem. In more detail, the principal still faces a trade-oﬀ between information rents and
output distortions, as it is the case in the standard paradigm. Yet, in our case, information rents can
be reduced by distorting the production undertaken by all types of the agent. This problem leads to
very interesting results that come in contrast to those in the literature of principal-agent problems with
hidden information. In more detail, in a two-types setting, we ﬁnd instances where the low-cost agent
undersupplies and the high-cost agent oversupplies its output under the optimal revelation mechanism,
and cases where the reversed production scheme is implemented.
3T h e M o d e l
Our model consists of a public agency and its sponsor. The agency is the sole producer of a non-
marketable good valued by the sponsor. The agency can be thought of as a group of citizens who
have an expertise in the production of the non-marketable good, i.e. in the attainment of the agency’s
mandated goal. The sponsor is assumed to be a decision-making body that has the authority of passing
legislation for determining the interaction of the polity with the public bureau. We call this body the
enacting coalition/legislature or the (political) principal.
Denote with q the veriﬁable measure of the bureaucratic performance towards the attainment of
the agency’s mandated goal. Assume that q ≥ 0. The agency’s (intermediate) output, q, is produced by
means of a technology which transforms θ units of the economy’s composite (numeraire) good into one
unit of public output. For a pensions administration bureau, the productive input of the agency may
take the form of oﬃces, computers and so on. For an army during peacetime, the productive input can
be thought of as the hours of training on the part of the weapons’ operators, the technology necessary
11to support the operation of the weapon systems and so on. For the purposes of our model, the monetary
cost of production of q units of public output is given by C(q,θ)=F + θq, where F ≥ 0 and θ > 0
are scalars. The ﬁxed cost of production F is common knowledge.29 The marginal cost of the agency’s
production θ can take either of two values. In more detail θ ∈ {θ1,θ2} ≡ Θ with respective probabilities
s and 1 − s. These probabilities are common knowledge. Let ∆θ ≡ θ2 − θ1 > 0. Assume that θ is not
veriﬁable.
The sponsor derives a utility B(q) from the bureau’s output, with B(0) ≥ 0,B 0 > 0,B 0(0) > λθ2,
limq→∞ B0(q)=0and B00 < 0. We follow the accounting convention that the principal bears up-front
the ﬁxed cost of setting up the agency. The utility on the part of the (political) principal net of the
ﬁxed cost is then deﬁned by
Us(q,t)=B(q) − λt,
where t is the (tax-ﬁnanced) budget allocated from the sponsor to the bureau, i.e. the units of the
composite good transferred to the agency, and λ > 0 is a scalar.30
Denote with Rmax > 0 the upper bound on the resources the bureau can attract after the ﬁxed
costs have been incurred. That is t ∈ [0,R max] ≡ T and Rmax = ¯ C −F, where ¯ C is the composite good
endowment of the economy. This endowment can be thought of as being the total tax revenues available
for public good production.
Deﬁne with t − θq the agency’s discretionary budget. This budget is a source of both pecuniary
and non-pecuniary beneﬁts for the agency. So, for instance, bureaucrats consume the discretionary
budget in the form of both wages and perquisites/rents. The agency may also derive higher prestige,
reputation e.t.c. from increases in the budget per se. The bureau then maximises
U(t,q;θ,a,b) ≡ bt + a(t − θq)=( a + b)t − aθq, (1)
where a ∈ [0,1] and b ≥ 0.31 T h ec a s eo fb>0 and a =0reﬂects a budget-maximising bureau
a-la Niskanen. At the other extreme, the case of b =0and a>0 represents a ‘proﬁt-maximising’
29Our results are qualitatively robust to allowing for a general cost function C(q,θ) with Cq > 0,C qq ≥ 0,C qθ > 0 and
C(0,θ)=F, where F ≥ 0 is a scalar. Note our assumption that the ﬁxed cost F is common knowledge. This assumption
of ours is discussed later on.
30Our results are robust to allowing for a general welfare function on the part of the principal Us(q,t) with the usual
properties. In the present simple set-up, one can think of λ as the (average) marginal deadweight loss of taxation on the
part of the citizens whose interests are pursued by the enacting coalition. See also Laﬀont and Tirole (1993) and Laﬀont
(2000). Note that in Niskanen (1971) the implicit assumption is λ =1 , which is also allowed for in our paper.
31Note that we implicitly assume that the marginal utility (in monetary terms) from the consumption of pecuniary
beneﬁts is equal to one and higher than the marginal utility (in monetary terms) from the consumption of non-pecuniary
beneﬁts that stem from an increase in the discretionary budget, because diverting resources towards perquisites bears
in general some cost for bureaucrtas. A direct implcation of the above assumption is that the marginal utility from an
increase in the discretionary budget cannot be greater than one. We also implicitly assume that the bureaucrats’ utility
does not depend positively on the level of output. Our results are qualitatively robust to a relaxation of this assumption.
12agency. Assume hereafter that b>0, and note that we restrict, thereby, our attention to the case of
an agency that does not aim at proﬁt-maximisation. The reason is twofold. First, the case of b =0
leads, as it will become clear later on, to a standard adverse selection problem which is well-understood.
Second, as we have argued in the Introduction we believe that administrative bureaus are not-for-proﬁt
organisations, which in turn implies that their managers do not pursue the goal of maximising the
bureau’s discretionary budget.
To lighten notation we also set hereafter b =1− a. Assume that a (and thus b)i sc o m m o n
knowledge.32 Given b =1− a, the parameter a represents the bureau head’s marginal disutility of
monetary production costs relative to the marginal utility of the budget-size (which is normalised to
one). Clearly then the case of a =0reﬂects a budget-maximising agency, and, at the other extreme,
the case of a =1represents a proﬁt-maximising bureau. Note also that given b =1− a>0 we have
that we focus hereafter on the case of a ∈ [0,1).33
Deﬁne with π ≡ (t,q) a possible allocation. Let us deﬁne also Π = {π/π ∈ T × R+}. Π is the
policy set vis-a-vis the bureaucracy: the set of all (technologically) possible allocations. The enacting
coalition chooses an element of Π. In principle, this policy choice could be conditioned, if possible, on
the marginal cost of public good production, θ, as well as on the other parameters s, a and λ. Let this
choice be denoted by an asterisk.34 In other words, a policy rule is a mapping y : Θ → Π and the
enacted policy rule y∗ is a mapping from the set of all possible mappings y.35 The enacted policy rule
y∗ is chosen by the legislature according to some criterion.
The criterion for the choice of the enacted policy rule will consist of two elements. First, it will
consist of the evaluation of any given policy y : the optimisation criterion. Second, it will consist of a
set of certain characteristics that any given policy y must satisfy: the set of policy constraints. The
principal is assumed to maximise:
W(y)=EθUs(q(θ),t(θ)) = Eθ[B(q(θ)) − λt(θ)],
This assumption can also be motivated with reference to transfer agencies. For the case of a bureau that administers, say,
pension claims, it seems natural to postulate that bureaucrats do not have a direct - or if they have it is of negligible size
- stake at the accuracy and speed of administering the claims.
32At this point it should be noted that an implicit assumption in Niskanen (1971) and the literature that originated
from this work is the one we have adopted in this paper as well. Namely that a is common knowledge. In principle a could
also be private information on the part of the agency. However, in this paper the focus is on asymmetric information with
respect to θ. We return to this point later on.
33As we will see later on, the limiting solution of our model as a → 1 corresponds to the solution of the standard adverse
selection problem.
34We supress hereafter the dependence of the (enacted) policy rule on s, a and λ.
35Note that such a mapping could as well be such that policies are independent of the marginal cost of production of
the public good.
13where Eθ denotes the expectation over θ. Let us denote with Y the set of all possible policy mappings,
Y = {y/y(θ) ∈ Π, ∀θ ∈ Θ}. The fact that the sponsor may be constrained in its policy choice is
captured by stating that y ∈ Y f ⊆ Y. Therefore, the political overseers of the public agency will
implement y∗ =a r gm a x
y∈Y f W(y). In what follows we look into the set Y f in more detail.
In this paper we postulate that the principal must choose an allocation rule from the set Y AC ≡
{y/ y(θ) ∈ Π and t(θ) ≥ θq(θ), ∀ θ ∈ Θ}. That is, the legislature must ensure that the budget of the
agency suﬃces for the ﬁnancing of the agency’s production costs. In other words, the sponsor must
not leave any residual burden to the agency regarding the production of the public good. We call this
an administrative constraint. Such a policy constraint is justiﬁed by our focus on public agencies that
produce non-marketable goods, and thus on agencies that have no means of ﬁnancing their production
costs other than their budget appropriation.36
We also assume that the bureau cannot be coerced by the legislator(s) to participate in some
institution/mechanism for the determination of some allocation. Accordingly, the principal, when decides
upon the policy rule y,faces the constraint that allocations must leave the bureau at least as well oﬀ as the
agency’s outside option. In this model the sponsor is the only buyer of the agency’s ‘expertise’ and hence
the bureaucrats’ utility from taking up their outside option is equal to zero.37 Let Y IR ≡ {y/y(θ) ∈ Π
and U(y(θ);θ,a) ≡ t(θ) − aθq(θ) ≥ 0, ∀θ ∈ Θ}. Assume that either (a) the agency knows its cost-type
prior to contracting with the legislature, or (b) the agency can always resign after it learns its cost-type.
It follows then that Y IR is the set of allocations which ensure that an agency of type θ receives, by
accepting to produce the public output, at least as much as it would earn by deciding to refuse to oﬀer its
expertise to the polity. To induce the agency to produce the public output regardless of the underlying
marginal cost of production,38 the sponsor must then choose a policy y such that y ∈ Y IR. Note
however that, due to a<1, the administrative constraint makes the (ex-post) participation constraint
redundant.39 That is, Y AC ⊂ Y IR, and hence we ignore in what follows the participation constraint.40
36This, of course, assumes implicitly that public servants are protected by means of a form of limited liability: they
cannot be forced by the legislature to decrease their net asset holdings to bear part of the public output’s production
costs.
37Our forthcoming results do not rest on the assumption that the reservation utility is equal to zero. All that is needed
is that the reservation utility is suﬃciently low.
38One can assume without loss of generality that ensuring the participation of an agent to any given mechanism is always
optimal from the principal’s point of view. This follows from the fact that the principal can replicate the outcome of any
mechanism for which the agent decides to take up an outside option of hers, by designing appropriately an alternative
mechanism which provides the agent with the level of utility she could derive by taking up the outside option in question.
39Obviously, the same would be true if we assumed instead that the agency does not know its cost-type prior to
contracting and that it cannot resign after contracting with the legislature, i.e. if Y IR was given by Y IR ≡ {y/y(θ) ∈ Π
and EθU(y(θ);θ,a) ≥ 0}. For this reason our results are robust to the introduction of such an assumption.
40Note that if the bureau was a proﬁt-maximising entity, i.e. b =0and a>0 (or a =1and b =1− a), then the
14Thus, note, also, that the administrative constraint eﬀectively restricts the bargaining power on the
part of the principal and increases the bargaining power on the part of the bureau.
Nevertheless, y ∈ Y AC may not be the only policy constraint that the enacting coalition may
face. An enacting legislature may in principle be restricted in its policy choice by some additional
constraints. One such transaction cost arises if the realisation of the marginal cost of public production
is private information on the part of the bureaucrats. In fact, in this paper we view bureaucrats as
specialists in the production of public output and thereby we do adopt the assumption that θ is the
private information of the bureau. Assuming the existence of a perfect and benevolent device which
ensures the enforceability of any contract,41 the Revelation Principle then tells us that the sponsor
can choose without loss of generality a policy rule from the set of incentive-compatible policy rules
Y IC ≡ {y/ y(θ) ∈ Π and U(y(θ);θ,a) ≥ t(θ
0) − aθq(θ
0) ≡ U(y(θ
0);θ,a), ∀ θ, θ
0 ∈ Θ, θ
0 6= θ}.
To summarise, in this paper we investigate the problem of a political principal who has the
authority of designing an administrative bureau which is characterised by marginal cost of production
θ. In particular, the principal seeks to maximise his expected welfare W(y) with respect to a policy rule
y. In doing so, the principal is restricted by the fact that the agency possesses superior information vis-
a-vis its sponsor with respect to the true production parameter θ. In addition, the enacting legislature
is constrained by the requirement that the bureau’s budget must at least cover the monetary cost of
producing the public good. That is, the set of admissible policy rules Y f is given by Y f = Y IC ∩Y AC.
Before leaving this Section, we consider a particular way with which the allocation rule y∗ can
be implemented in reality. Note that Π is a product set. This enables the enacting coalition to replace
the direct revelation contract y∗ : Θ → Π with a contract d : t∗(Θ) → Q, where d(t∗(θ)) = q∗(θ) for
any θ ∈ Θ. Under this mechanism the bureau is oﬀered a menu of budgets {t∗(θ1),t ∗(θ2)}. Each of
the budgets from this menu is associated with a given level of production, according to the mapping
d. If, then, the bureau chooses a certain budget from this menu, the agency is obliged to produce the
corresponding level of public output. Accordingly, bureaucrats face, in eﬀect, the problem of either
taking up their outside option or choosing an allocation from a menu of allocations {y∗(θ1),y ∗(θ2)}.
Given that y∗ ∈ Y f, the enacting coalition can be certain that a public bureau will not take up its
outside option and that if the agency is characterised by a marginal cost of production θ it will indeed
choose the allocation y∗(θ).
administrative constraint would be equivalent to the ex-post participation constraint.
41Note that we restrict our analysis to the case of deterministic policy mappings. This can be motivated by postulating
that stochastic allocation rules are hard to be enforced by a court of law.
154 The Optimal Bureaucracy
In this Section we assume that the technological upper-bound Rmax is very large, so that we can ignore
the technological constraints t(θ) ≤ Rmax for any θ. We relax this assumption in Section 6.
We start our analysis by ﬁnding the optimal allocations when information is symmetric.42 That
is, we start with ﬁnding the solution of maxW(y) subject to y ∈ Y AC. It follows in a straightforward
manner that the principal is better oﬀ by leaving no ‘excess budget’ to the agency (i.e. to(θ)=θqo(θ)
for any θ ∈ Θ) and asking the bureau to provide the level of output qo(θ) that satisﬁes:
B0(qo(θ)) = λθ, θ ∈ Θ. (2)
Note that qo
1 ≡ qo(θ1) >q o
2 ≡ qo(θ2) > 0. Deﬁne also to
i ≡ to(θi),i=1 ,2.
Thus under symmetric information the budget matches the minimum cost of production We will
refer hereafter to such a case as the principal leaving no rents to the agent. Furthermore, output is, as
it was expected, a decreasing function of the marginal cost of production and of the sponsor’s marginal
disutility of a higher budget, λ. In other words, output is negatively related to the social marginal cost
of production λθ. We will refer to the production level qo(θ) as the eﬃcient (from the principal’s point
of view) level of (public good) production.
For a given marginal cost of production θ, the principal will indeed oﬀer the contract in question to
the agency and public output will be produced if the social value of public output production B(qo(θ))−






2 > 0. The
ﬁrst inequality follows from the deﬁnition of qo
1, the second inequality follows from ∆θ > 0 and the third
inequality follows from the properties of B(q). Thus a suﬃcient condition for production to always take




2 + F) ≥ 0. (3)
We maintain this assumption throughout. Accordingly, under complete information the agency is set





2] − F>0. (4)
We now move to the investigation of the optimal contract under asymmetric information. The
revelation principle tells us that this contract can take the form of a pair of sub-contracts, or allocations,
(q1,t 1), (q2,t 2) which satisfy the following incentive-compatibility constraints:
U1 ≥ U2 + a∆θq2 (5)
U2 ≥ U1 − a∆θq1 (6)
42These allocations are denoted with the superscript o.
16where Ui ≡ ti −aθiqi,t i = t(θi) and qi = q(θi),i=1 ,2. These constraints simply say that a bureau will
ﬁnd it in its interest to choose the sub-contract which is designed for an agency of its cost-type.
Using the deﬁnitions for Ui, the administrative constraints for any value of θ become:
U1 ≥ (1 − a)θ1q1 (7)
U2 ≥ (1 − a)θ2q2 (8)
The optimal mechanism, from the sponsor’s point of view, is then the pair of contracts (Ui,q i),i=1 ,2,
with qi ≥ 0, which maximise
s[B(q1) − λ(U1 + aθ1q1)] + (1 − s)[B(q2) − λ(U2 + aθ2q2)] (9)
subject to (5)-(8). In what follows, let us denote with (U∗
i (a),q∗
i (a)),i=1 ,2, the optimal contract
oﬀered to the agency, given the utility parameter a.43.
Note that this is not a standard adverse selection problem, since a ∈ [0,1). To see this, observe
that in contrast to the standard adverse selection problem, the ‘reservation utilities’ - i.e. the right
hand side of (7) and (8) - depend on the action of the agent.44 Interestingly, this enables the sponsor















i (a)=( 1− a)θiq∗
i (a), for any i =1 ,2,
where a∗ ≡ θ1/θ2 ∈ (0,1). Note that the condition in the above statement is nothing else but the




























] we have that the administrative bureau will be set up and it will
produce the eﬃcient level of public good at minimum cost, regardless of the level of the marginal cost
of production.46 We will refer to this environment as the Eﬃcient Regime:47
































i (a), for any i =1 ,2.





1 / ∈ [a∗−a
1−a ,
a∗(1−a)
1−aa∗ ]. Clearly, then (U∗
i (a),q∗
i (a)) will diﬀer from the
43We supress the dependence of the optimal contract on λ and s.
44Note that if a → 1 then the ‘reservation utilities’ tend to zero and hence our problem approximates the standard
adverse selection problem (we return to this later on).
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47The result that a principal may be able to implement the unconstrained optimum appears also in adverse selection
problems where the reservation utility is type-dependent. See, for instance, Jullien (2000).
17ﬁrst-best contract.48 The principal now has three options. One, is to set up only the low-cost agency.
That is, one option is to oﬀer a contract such that U2(a)=q2(a)=0 ,q 1(a) > 0 and a∆θq1(a) ≥
U1(a) ≥ (1 − a)θ1q1(a), and bear the ﬁxed cost F only if the sub-contract {U1(a),q 1(a)} is chosen by
the bureau’s head. Clearly, this option is available only if a ≥ a∗. Oﬀering this contract will result in
the low-cost agency operating according to the sub-contract {U1(a),q 1(a)} and the high-cost agency
being, in eﬀect, shut down.49 Obviously the optimal shutdown contract will feature q1(a)=qo
1 and
U1(a)=( 1−a)θ1qo
1. Accordingly, under this policy the low-cost agency will be set up and it will operate
in an eﬃcient manner at the expense of no public production when the marginal cost is high. We will
say that the contract {US
2 (a)=qS




1} is a contract with shutdown
of the high-cost bureau. The resulting welfare on the part of the principal is
s[B(qo
1) − λ(θ1qo
1 + F)] > 0. (11)
The second option for the legislature is to shut down the bureau regardless of its cost-type. That
is, to oﬀer a contract {UO
i (a)=qO
i (a)=0 ,i=1 ,2}, bear no ﬁxed cost and attain zero welfare We call
this policy the null contract. Clearly, this option is not optimal if a ≥ a∗. The reason is that if a ≥ a∗
then the principal is better oﬀ by oﬀering the contract with shutdown of the high-cost bureau.
The third option for the principal is to set up the agency, i.e. bear the ﬁxed cost F, regardless of
its cost-type. In presenting the corresponding optimum mechanism, i.e. the optimal contract with no
shutdown, it will prove useful to employ the following deﬁnitions:
ˆ qi(a), for any i =1 ,2, are deﬁned by
B0(ˆ q1(a)) = λaθ1 and (12)








s[B0(¯ q1(x)) − λθ1]
(1 − s)[B0(¯ q2(x)) − λθ2]
= x,f o rs o m ex>0. (13)
We distinguish between two cases:
48It is interesting to note that the above implies that if we had assumed that the polity is faced with a pool of ‘experts’





, the legislature would have appointed the agency which is characterised























]. Accordingly, bureaucracy would be eﬃcient in the presence of competition between





. For related discussions on how do politicians decide which bureaus to create see Fiorina
(1982), McCubbins (1985), Calvert et. al. (1989) and Banks and Weingast (1992).
49Note that shutting down only the low-cost agency is not incentive compatible. In fact, such a contract would require
that q2(a) > 0,U 2(a) ≤− a∆θq2(a), and U2(a) ≥ (1 − a)θ2q2(a), which is not feasible.
184.1 The Convergence Case





















1−a and a<a ∗.
It turns out that for the derivation of the optimal mechanism with no shutdown we can ignore
the incentive-compatibility constraint for the low-cost agency (5): this constraint is satisﬁed ex post
as a strict inequality. We can also ignore the constraints qi ≥ 0. M o r e o v e r ,w eh a v et h a tt h eo p t i m a l
mechanism with no shutdown is given by the pair of contracts (UC
1 (a),qC




i (a)=( 1− a)θiqC
i (a),U C
2 (a)=UC
1 (a) − a∆θqC
1 (a), and qC
i (a), for any i =1 ,2, which maximise50






It follows then directly that optimal production with no shutdown is given by:51
qC





Consequently, in this case excess cost of production is not a concern. In addition, public services
are always produced. Furthermore, and more interestingly, output distortions are present regardless of









1 (a) <q o
1. That is, the high-cost agency oversupplies and the low-cost bureau undersupplies its output.
We refer to this environment as the Convergence Contract/Regime because the production distortions
bring closer the production levels of the two cost-types.
The intuition behind this mechanism is the following: Recall again that the unconstrained max-
imum is given by Ui =( 1− a)θiqi and qi = qo





1−a . It follows that
this is not a constrained maximum since it violates (6): the high-cost agency has an incentive to report
that it faces a low marginal cost. To implement qi = qo
i at a minimum cost the principal must leave
with the high-cost bureau rents of (θ1 − aθ2)q1 − (1 − a)θ2q2 -i . e .i tm u s tb et h a tU2 = θ2(a∗ − a)q1
with q1 = qo
1. The high-cost bureau is then indiﬀerent between the two contracts, i.e. U2 = U1 −a∆θq1
with q1 = qo







1−a ). Thus a marginal decrease in q1 or a marginal increase in q2 is feasible.
This implies that the sponsor is faced with the following trade-oﬀ. Decreasing marginally the output
of the low-cost agent results in a change in the welfare of the principal of s[B0(q1) − λaθ1] units. At
the same time, though, a marginal decrease of the low-cost agency’s output reduces the utility of an
50See Appendix A for more details.
51Note that U2 = U1 − a∆θq1 becomes - after using Ui =( 1− a)θiqi for any i =1 ,2 - q2 = a∗−a
1−a q1.
19agency of any type (since U1 =( 1− a)θ1q1 and U2 = θ2(a∗ − a)q1). This amounts to a welfare gain of
λ[s(1 − a)θ1 +( 1− s)θ2(a∗ − a)] units. Alternatively, the principal can increase marginally the output
of the high-cost bureau and face a welfare change of (1 − s)[B0(q2) − λaθ2]. By doing so the principal
does not aﬀect the utility of an agency of any cost-type (since U1 =( 1−a)θ1q1 and U2 = θ2(a∗ −a)q1).
In eﬀect, then the sponsor can do even better by setting U1 =( 1− a)θ1q1 and U2 = θ2(a∗ − a)q1, to
induce truth-telling on the part of the high-cost agency at minimum cost, and choosing q1 and q2 that
maximise s[B(q1) − λθ1q1]+( 1− s)[B(q2) − λθ2((a∗ − a)q1 + aq2)] subject to the high-cost agency’s




1−a . The solution of this problem is given
by (16).52
Recall that in the present case we have that a<a ∗. Hence, in this case the contract with shutdown
of the high-cost bureau is not feasible. It follows then directly that:
















). Then, (a) if s[B(¯ q1(x)) −λθ1¯ q1(x)] +
(1 − s)[B(¯ q2(x)) − λθ2¯ q2(x)] <Fwith x = a∗−a
1−a the second-best contract is the null contract {t∗
i(a)=
q∗
i (a)=0 ,i=1 ,2}, i.e. the principal shuts down the agency regardless of its cost-type, and (b) if
s[B(¯ q1(x)) − λθ1¯ q1(x)] + (1 − s)[B(¯ q2(x)) − λθ2¯ q2(x)] ≥ F then the second-best contract is the optimal
contract with no shutdown {t∗
i(a)=θiq∗
i (a),q ∗
i (a)=¯ q2(x),i=1 ,2}, i.e. the agency operates under the
convergence regime.
I ft h ev a r i a b l ec o s to fe ﬃcient production is higher when the marginal cost of production is low




1 ) and the bureau’s marginal disutility from variable production costs is suﬃciently low











)) then we have that if the social value of the convergence regime is non-negative the







1. If, instead, the social value of this regime is negative the legislature
will shut down the agency regardless of its cost-type. That is, the principal will incur no ﬁxed costs and
public output will not be produced.
4.2 The Divergence Case




















,1). Note that for




































It turns out that when we examine the optimal mechanism with no shutdown we can ignore the
incentive-compatibility constraint for the high-cost agency (6): this constraint is satisﬁed ex post as a
strict inequality. We can also ignore the constraints qi(a) ≥ 0. In addition, we have that the optimal
mechanism with no shutdown is given by the pair of contracts (UD
1 (a),qD
1 (a)) and (UD
2 (a),qD
2 (a)) with
52Note that the unconstrained optimum of the problem in question is given by q0
1 and q0














1−a , and the constraint is violated. Accordingly,
the solution to the problem in question must satisfy (16).
20UD




2 (a), and qD
i (a), for any i =1 ,2, which maximise53




1 − aa∗ q1. (18)
Note that the constraint in the above problem is nothing else but the administrative constraint for the
low-cost agency, when this agency is indiﬀerent between the contract designed for it and the contract
designed for the high-cost bureau and when the high-cost agency’s administrative constraint is binding.
It follows that production under this scheme is given by54
qD
i (a)=ˆ qi(a) > 0, for any i =1 ,2, if ˆ q2(a) ≥
a∗(1 − a)
1 − aa∗ ˆ q1(a) (19)
or
qD
i (a)=¯ qi(x) > 0 with x =
a∗(1 − a)
1 − aa∗ , for any i =1 ,2, if ˆ q2(a) <
a∗(1 − a)
1 − aa∗ ˆ q1(a). (20)
Accordingly, in this case as well production is strictly positive and output distortions is a problem
regardless of the bureau’s cost-type.55 However, the form of output distortions here diﬀers from the one







and conditions (19) and (20) that qD
2 (a) <q o
2 <q o
1 <q D
1 (a). That is, the high-cost agency undersupplies
and the low-cost bureau oversupplies public services. The case under scrutiny here diﬀers also from the
Convergence Regime in the sense that here problems of excess production cost may arise. The reason
is that now the low-cost agency’s administrative constraint may be slack, i.e. the low-cost agency may
enjoy information rents. Clearly, this will be the case if and only if ˆ q2(a) >
a∗(1−a)
1−aa∗ ˆ q1(a). Equivalently,
excessive costs of production arise if and only if either a∗ <
ˆ q2(a)









ˆ q1(a)),1).56 Using UD




2 (a) and the deﬁnition
for Ui(a) we can see that the excessive production costs (when the agency is of low cost) are equal to
θ2[(1 − aa∗)qD
2 (a) − a∗(1 − a)qD
1 (a)].
We refer to the above mechanism (irrespective of the existence of information rents for the low-
cost agency) as the Divergence Regime/Contract because the production distortions bring further away
the production levels of the two cost-types. The intuition behind this regime is similar to the one behind
the Convergence Regime.
53See Appendix B for more details.
54See Appendix C for the derivation.





2(a)) > 0, and thus the high-cost







































21Note that for the range of parameters we consider in this Sub-Section a may be lower as well as
higher than a∗. Thus, apart from the Divergence Contract, in the ﬁrst case shutting down the agency
is also a feasible contract, and in the latter case the contract with shutdown of the high-cost bureau is
also a feasible mechanism. It follows then directly that:




















,1). Then, (a) if
s[B(qD
1 (a))−aλθ1qD




2 (a)] <Fthe second-best contract is (i) the null
contract {t∗
i(a)=q∗
i (a)=0 ,i=1 ,2}, i.e. the principal shuts down the agency regardless of its cost-type,







1},i fa ≥ a∗. Also, (b) if s[B(qD
1 (a)) − aλθ1qD
1 (a)] + (1 − s)[B(qD
















i.e. the agency operates under the divergence regime. Finally, (c) if 0 ≤ s[B(qD
1 (a)) − aλθ1qD
1 (a)] +
(1 − s)[B(qD
2 (a)) − λθ2
1−saa∗
1−s qD
2 (a)] − F<s [B(qo
1) − λ(θ1qo
1 + F)] the second-best contract is (i) the
contract with no shutdown, if a<a ∗, or (ii) the contract with shutdown of the high-cost agency, if
a ≥ a∗.
I ft h ev a r i a b l ec o s to fe ﬃcient production is higher when the marginal cost of production is high





1 ) or if the variable cost of eﬃcient production is not lower when the marginal cost of




1 ) and the bureau’s marginal disutility from variable production costs is












,1)) then we have that the following cases. First, if either a<a ∗ and
the social value of the divergence regime is non-negative or if a ≥ a∗ and the social value of the divergence
regime is not lower than the social value of shutting down the high-cost agency, then the agency will
be set up and the production plan {q∗
1(a),q ∗





high-cost agency will operate at minimum cost, whilst the low-cost agency may enjoy information rents.
Second, if a<a ∗ and the social value of the divergence regime is negative the legislature will shut down
the agency regardless of its cost-type. Third, if a ≥ a∗ and the social value of the divergence regime is
lower than the social value of shutting down the high-cost agency, then the legislature will shut down
the high-cost agency and the low-cost agency will operate in an eﬃcient way.
5 Comparative Statics and Discussion of Results
Summarising our results, we have that if a<a ∗ the principal may ﬁnd it optimal to shut down the agency
regardless of its cost-type. Also if a ≥ a∗ the legislature may ﬁnd it optimal to shut down the high-cost
agency. In this case the low-cost bureau will operate in an eﬃcient way. When the enacting coalition
ﬁnds it optimal to set up the administrative bureau, regardless of its cost-type, the high-cost bureau
presents the polity with no excess-cost problem. In addition, a low-cost bureaucracy does not suﬀer
from an excess-cost problem, unless either a∗ <
ˆ q2(a)
ˆ q1(a) and the bureau is characterised by a ∈ [0,1) or
22a∗ ≥
ˆ q2(a)






ˆ q1(a)),1).C o n c e r n i n gt h ee ﬃciency properties of the production plan, we have
that if the cost of production of the eﬃcient level of public good is strictly increasing with the marginal




1, then the production plan follows the scheme in the Divergence Regime;
that is, the low-cost bureau is characterised by overproduction and the high-cost agency undersupplies




1 , we have that (i) if a =0then there are no output distortions, and




1 ,w eh a v et h a t( i )i fa is











), then the Convergence Regime is implemented; that is, the low-cost
bureau is characterised by underproduction and the high-cost agency oversupplies its output, (ii) if a is























], then the Eﬃcient Regime is implemented, and












,1), then the Divergence Regime is implemented.
To get a closer look at how the extend of the above output distortions depend on λ, skills dispersion
and the likelihood of the marginal cost being low, recall that the output of the high-cost bureau is given

















recall that in these cases the output of the low-cost bureau is given by s[B0(¯ q1(a)) − λθ1]+( 1−
s)[B0(x¯ q1(a))−λθ2]x =0 . Note that x is negatively related to the marginal disutility on the part of the
agency from higher production costs, a.
It follows directly that output levels are decreasing in the marginal costs of production. Moreover,
since ¯ q2(x) <q o
2 if x =
a∗(1−a)
1−aa∗ , we have that in this case production levels are decreasing in the
probability that the marginal cost is low, whilst the eﬀect of x (and thus of a) on output levels is
ambiguous. Finally, since ¯ q2(x) >q o
2 if x = a∗−a
1−a , we have that in this case production levels are
increasing in the likelihood of the marginal cost of production being low and decreasing in the marginal
disutility on the part of the bureau from higher production costs.
















ˆ q1(a). Clearly then the output of the low-cost (resp. high
cost) bureau is decreasing (resp. increasing) in θ1, and the output of the high-cost agency is decreasing
in θ2. Furthermore, the low-cost agency’s output is independent of whilst the production level of the
high-cost bureau is decreasing in the probability that the marginal cost is low. In addition, production
levels are decreasing in the cost of public funds. Finally, the production level of the low-cost agency is
decreasing and the high-cost agency’s output is increasing in the marginal disutility on the part of the
bureau from higher production costs.
As our discussion in Section 2 implies our model of bureaucracy is directly comparable to the
literature a-la Niskanen. The ﬁrst diﬀerence of our results with that literature is that here the sponsor
may ﬁnd it optimal to implement a shut down policy. In more detail, if a<a ∗ the sponsor may ﬁnd it
optimal to shut down the bureau regardless of the realised marginal cost of public output production,
23and if a ≥ a∗ the sponsor may ﬁnd it optimal; to ﬁnance public production only if the agency is of the
low-cost type.
Focusing on the case where a public agency is set up regardless of its cost-type, we have that
our results are strikingly diﬀerent to the ones in Migue and Belanger (1974). These authors ﬁnd that
if a ∈ (0,1) then bureaucrats oversupply public services and enjoy an excessive budget, regardless of
the true cost of production. In addition, they show that a higher marginal cost of production implies a
less acute excessive cost problem. Finally, their analysis implies that the greater a, the more acute the
excessive cost problem and the smaller the oversupply problem are.
However, we show here that bureaucratic eﬃciency should not be taken out of the picture. More-
over, our results imply that, even if bureaus provide an ineﬃcient level of public goods, underproduction
of the bureau’s output is also a possibility. Furthermore, we also show that for suﬃciently low values of
a there is no excess cost problem no matter what the underlying marginal cost of production is. Finally,
our model implies that the excessive cost problem is non-negatively related to and that there is no clear
relationship between the extend of production ineﬃciencies and a. It is obvious also that our present
results imply that, in contrast to Breton and Wintrobe (1975), overproduction may not be a less serious
problem than excess cost of production.
One of the fundamental assumptions in Niskanen (1971) is that bureaucrats maximise their bud-
get. Our model can be used to ﬁnd the implications for the design of such an agency, by considering the














then the public agency a-la Niskanen operates under the convergence regime.
The above ﬁndings are in contrast to the results in Niskanen (1971) and Miller and Moe (1983).
Niskanen (1971) ﬁnds that a bureau, regardless of its cost-type, operates at minimum cost, whilst
Miller and Moe (1983) demonstrate that when marginal production costs are suﬃciently low the agency
enjoys an excessive budget.57 Furthermore, Niskanen (1971) postulates that bureaucracy oversupplies
regardless of the underlying true cost of production. Finally, in Miller and Moe (1983), if the marginal
cost of production is suﬃciently high output is at its eﬃcient level, and if the marginal production cost
is suﬃciently low then there is undersupply. As our discussion in Section 2 makes it clear, the reason
for this diﬀerence in results stems from the fact that in Niskanen (1971) and Miller and Moe (1983) the
sponsor is restricted to not being able to implement the best, from his point of view, mechanism.
We leave this section by taking a closer look at the behaviour of the solution without shutdown
when a → 1, and thus by investigating an agency that, is set up and, behaves at the limit as a proﬁt-
maximising entity. Examining this case bears an interest because when Dixit (2000) discusses hidden
information problems in the design of a bureaucracy the public agency is assumed to be a proﬁt-
57This result of Miller and Moe (1983) appears also in Casa-Pardo and Puchades-Navarro (2001).
24maximiser. As we see below such an assumption ensures that the low-cost agency will always be set
up, bureaucracy will always be ineﬃcient, and the public agency will never operate in the Convergence
Regime.
Taking the limit of the solution of our model as a → 1, one can ﬁnd whether such a public
bureau would operate in an eﬃcient way or not. Deﬁning q∗
i (1) ≡ lima→1 q∗
i (a) for any i =1 ,2 we ﬁnd
that our solution approximates the solution of the standard adverse selection problem. In more detail,
note that as a → 1 we are in the realm of the Divergence Regime. Note also that lima→1
a∗(1−a)
1−aa∗ =0
and that if B0(0) > λθ2
1−sa∗





2(1) ≥ 0, with q∗
2(1) = 0 if B0(0) ∈ (λθ2,λθ2
1−sa∗
1−s ] and q∗




1−s = λθ2+λ s
1−s∆θ if B0(0) > λθ2
1−sa∗
1−s . Finally, we have that the high-cost bureau
operates at minimum cost and the low-cost agency enjoys information rents equal to ∆θq∗
2(1).
Therefore a proﬁt-maximising low-cost bureau will provide the eﬃcient level of public services.
The high-cost agency, on the other hand, will undersupply its output. The latter agency’s budget
however matches its cost of production, whilst the low-cost bureau’s information advantage results in
excessive cost of production if q∗
2(1) > 0. That is, the-low cost agency may be characterised by an
excessive-cost problem while the high-cost agency always suﬀers from an undersupply problem.58
Note that the above results are in contrast to the ones in Migue and Belanger (1975). In that
paper, if the bureau cares only about the discretionary budget, i.e. proﬁts, output is at its eﬃcient level
and there is an excessive cost problem regardless of the realised marginal cost of production.59 Our
present result also imply that, in contrast to Breton and Wintrobe (1975), excess cost of production
may not be a more serious problem than overproduction. In particular, the above result implies that
with probability s bureaucracy is characterised by excessive costs of production and with probability
1 − s by underproduction.
6 Limited Resources
In this Section we examine the robustness of our results to the introduction of limited resources for the
ﬁnance of public output production. That is, we investigate the optimal mechanism when the legislature
is also constrained from t(θ) ≤ Rmax.
58Clearly, if B0(0) ∈ (λθ2,λθ2
1−sa∗
1−s ] then the principal ﬁnds it optimal to shut down the high-cost agency in order to
save on ﬁxed costs. If on the other hand B0(0) > λθ2
1−sa∗
1−s ] then the legislature shuts down the high-cost bureau if and
only if (1 − s)[B(q∗
2(1))− (θ2 + s
1−s∆θ)q∗
2(1)] ≥ (1 − s)F.
59Note, however, that Migue and Belanger (1975) do ﬁnd that the excessive cost problem is less acute and production
is lower when the marginal cost is high.
25Using the deﬁnitions for Ui, the resource constraints for any value of θ become:
U1 ≤ Rmax − aθ1q1 (21)
U2 ≤ Rmax − aθ2q2. (22)
Deﬁne also qi
max ≡ Rmax/θi,i=1 ,2. Observe that q1
max >q 2
max,i np a r t i c u l a ra∗q1
max = q2
max. Note that,
given the assumed public production technology, if public output is produced at minimum cost, i.e. if
t = θiq, then the resource constraint t ≤ Rmax implies a technological constraint q ≤ qi
max, and vice
versa. In general, however, it might be the case, as we have seen, that t>θiq : public production takes
place at excessive costs.
Assume that qo
i <q i
max. That is, assume that the eﬃcient production plan can be ﬁnanced at
minimum cost given the available resources for public production. It follows then directly that the
Eﬃcient Regime is not aﬀected by the introduction of limited resources: Proposition 1 remains valid.
In addition, given that 0 <q o
2 < ¯ q2(x) < ¯ q1(x) <q o
1 <q 1
max when x = a∗−a
1−a , one can also show that the
same is true for the Convergence Contract: Proposition 2 remains valid.60 In fact, under both regimes,
the administrative bureau, regardless of its cost-type, absorbs less than the available resources.
Turning to the case when in the absence of limited resources the Divergence Regime is relevant,
we have that in deriving the optimal mechanism without shutdown we can ignore without loss of
generality the incenitve-compatibility and resource constraints for the high-cost agency. Accordingly,
the mechanism in question is given by the pair of contracts (UD
1 (a),qD








2 (a), and qD
i (a), for any i =1 ,2, which maximise61








max − aq1). (25)
Note that the latter constraint is the resource constraint for the low-cost agency when the low-cost
agency is indiﬀerent between the contract designed for it and the contract designed for the high-cost
bureau and when the high-cost agency’s administrative constraint is binding.
It follows then directly that if a∗
1−aa∗(q1
max − aˆ q1(a)) ≥ ˆ q2(a) ≥
a
∗(1−a)
1−aa∗ ˆ q1(a) then we can ignore
the latter two constraints in the above problem. Production plan is then given by qD
i (a)=ˆ qi(a) > 0
for any i =1 ,2, with ˆ q2(a) <q o
2 <q 2
max and ˆ q2(a) <q o
2 <q o
1 < ˆ q2(a). Thus the ignored constraints
are satisﬁed. Moreover, if ˆ q2(a) <
a∗(1−a)
1−aa∗ ˆ q1(a) and ¯ q2(x) ≤ a∗
1−aa∗(q1
max − a¯ q1(x)), with x =
a∗(1−a)
1−aa∗ ,
60See Appendix D for more details.
61See Appendix E for more details.
26then we can ignore the last constraint in the above problem. By doing so, we have in a straightforward
manner that qD
i (a)=¯ qi(x) for any i =1 ,2, with ¯ q2(x) <q o
2 <q 2
max and ¯ q2(a) <q o
2 <q o
1 < ¯ q1(a). Thus,
again, the ignored constraints are not violated. Accordingly, in all these cases the divergence regime
with unlimited resources we have analysed in Section 4 is still valid: Proposition 3 still holds.
Note that if a =0then ˆ q1(0) →∞and ˆ q2(0) <q o
2. Thus, ˆ q2(0) <
a∗(1−a)
1−aa∗ ˆ q1(0) and the divergence
contract with unrestricted resources implements the production plan {¯ q1(a∗), ¯ q2(a∗)}. Note then that











That is, if the bureau is a budget-maximising entity then the divergence contract under unrestricted
r e s o u r c e si sr o b u s tt ot h ei n t r oduction of limited resources.
Consider, now the remaining cases of a ∈ (0,1), and either (a) ˆ q2(a) <
a∗(1−a)
1−aa∗ ˆ q1(a) and ¯ q2(x) >
a∗
1−aa∗(q1
max −a¯ q1(x)), or (b) ˆ q2(a) ≥
a
∗(1−a)
1−aa∗ ˆ q1(a) and ˆ q2(a) > a∗
1−aa∗(q1
max −aˆ q1(a)). Now, the low-cost
agency’s resource constraint is binding. This implies that if this agency does not enjoy information rents
the principal must decrease the agency’s output to meet the resource requirements. If the bureau in
question operates at excessive costs the legislature must decrease any rents left to this bureau to meet
the resource constraint. In any case, the sponsor must alter the production plan in order to prevent
the low-cost bureau from mimicking the high-cost agency. To describe the optimal mechanism without




max − aˇ q1(a)) (26)
s[B0(ˇ q1(a)) − aλθ1]





1 − aa∗. (27)





1−aa∗ ˇ q1(a), and either ˆ q2(a) ≥
a∗(1−a)
1−aa∗ ˆ q1(a) or ˆ q2(a) <
a∗(1−a)
1−aa∗ ˆ q1(a) and ¯ q2(x) > a∗
1−aa∗(q1
max−
a¯ q1(x)) with x =
a∗(1−a)
1−aa∗ . In this case, the low-cost agency’s administrative constraint is non-binding,
ˇ q2(x) < ˇ q1(x) and 0 <q D
i (a)=ˇ qi(x) < ˆ qi(a), for any i =1 ,2. The latter implies that ˇ q2(x) <q o
2 <q 2
max.
Not also that ˇ q1(x) ∈ (q2
max,q1
max).
Under this mechanism the high-cost agency underproduces at minimum cost without exhausting
resources. The low-cost agency, on the other hand, absorbs all available resources for the production
of public output. It also produces at excessive cost. Note, however, that in contrast to the case of
unlimited resources, the low-cost bureau may as well produce the eﬃcient level of public output, or even
underproduce, depending on the parameters. Accordingly, in this case limited resources may prevent
the sponsor from diverging the output of the low-cost and high-cost agencies.
Finally, in the remaining range of parameters, both the low-cost agency’s administrative and












max. Observe that qD
2 (a) may be lower as well as higher than qo
2. In fact, sgn{qo
2 − q2} =




Under this mechanism the agency, regardless of its cost-type, produces at minimum cost. Also
the low-cost agency overproduces and exhausts all available resources. The high-cost agency, however,
does not absorb all resources, and the direction of its output distortion is ambiguous. Therefore, in this
case as well limited resources may prevent the legislature from diverging the output of the low-cost and
high-cost public bureaus.
It is of some interest to note that under limited resources, and for any range of parameters, only
the low-cost agency may confront the society with a problem of exhausted resources.T h i sm a yl e a dt h e
political principal to decide to implement a shut-down policy. It is also interesting to note that when
limited resources prevent the sponsor from diverging the output of the low-cost and high-cost public
agencies we may have an outcome where both agencies underproduce. This is clearly in striking contrast
to the results in the literature a-la Niskanen. However, we may also have an outcome where an agency
overproduces at minimum cost, regardless of its cost-type. Accordingly, we may have an outcome very
similar to the one advocated by Niskanen (1971). Note however that this result can emerge, in our set
up, only if there are limited resources and the agency is not a budget-maximising entity.
7 Conclusions
We have argued that an administrative bureau with standard operating procedures is involved in a
bilateral trade with the legislative branch of the government for the production of a non-marketable
good. We have also emphasised that this trade is hindered by an administrative constraint which
requires budget appropriations to cover monetary production costs, and that such a bureau is not
ap r o ﬁt-maximising entity. We have also adopted he view that the sponsor of the agency, i.e. the
legislature, should be treated as the side with the complete control of the agenda and not vice versa.
The bureau under investigation, on the other hand, should be thought of as the side with the monopoly
of information over exogenous characteristics that are pertinent to the relation. According to this view
then, in the presence of an external enforcing mechanism which ensures the enforceability of contracts,
one can go back to the revelation principle and investigate the optimal design of the bureaucracy in
question, and the implications for the agency’s ineﬃciencies.
The revelation principle tells us that in the absence of restrictions on contracts any form of such
a bureaucracy is equivalent to an organisation in which information ﬂows in an incentive-compatible
way directly from the agency to the sponsor who transmits instructions back to the bureau about the
veriﬁable activities to be carried out. It follows that the best organisation is obtained in the form of the
optimal revelation mechanism.
Our study reveals that this revelation mechanism possesses the following characteristics. First,
the public agency may not always be funded. Second, the bureaucracy under scrutiny can, under certain
28conditions, be eﬃcient. In this case, the output of the low-cost agency is higher than the output of the
high-cost bureau.
Third, both problems of excessive cost and ineﬃcient levels of production may undermine the
eﬃcient operation of the bureaucracy. In more detail, excessive-cost problems are present if and only
if bureaucrats’ marginal disutility from higher production costs is very high. Concerning production
distortions, we have that if the agency’s marginal disutility from higher production costs is low enough
then the low-cost agency underproduces and the high-cost bureau. That is, production levels converge,
relative to eﬃcient production. If, on the other hand, the bureau’s marginal disutility from higher
production costs is high the kind of production ineﬃciencies depends on the available resources for the
ﬁnance of production costs. In particular, in the presence of unlimited resources the low-cost agency
overproduces and the high-cost bureau underproduces. That is, production levels diverge relative to
eﬃcient production. Limited resources, however, may prevent the legislature from diverging the output
of the low-cost and high-cost agencies, relative to eﬃcient production.
In this paper we have assumed that bureaucrats do not have an outside option. Nevertheless, our
results are valid if the derived utility from this option is not too high. An interesting exercise would be
to investigate the robustness of our results to the introduction of a highly valuable outside option on
the part of the agency.
M o r e o v e r ,w eh a v ea s s u m e dt h a tt h eo n l ys o u r c eo fa s y m m e t r i ci n f o r m a t i o ni st h em a r g i n a lc o s t
of production. In reality, however, the ﬁxed cost could also be private information on the part of the
bureau. In such an environment the sponsor will be faced with bidimensional asymmetric information.
This would also be the case if the bureau’s preference parameter a is as well private information on
the part of the agency. The investigation of the optimal design of an ABSOP in the presence of
multidimensional asymmetric information is a very interesting and challenging topic and is left for
future research.63
In our model, the administrative constraint which must be satisﬁed under the optimal mechanism
depends, when it is expresses in agency’s utility terms, on the output of the bureau and is stricter than
the (standard) voluntary-participation constraint. As we have seen the resulting problem gives results
that diﬀer signiﬁcantly from the ones of the standard adverse selection problems where the individual-
rationality constraint is not redundant.64 This leads us to conjecture that extending the above literature
to the case that the principal faces a non-redundant ‘administrative constraint’ is worthwhile both from
a theoretical point of view and for the deeper understanding of the operation of bureaucracy. So, for
instance, one could investigate the case of a continuum of types, the case of the principal also having
private information, the case of repeated interactions and the case of common agency. These tasks are
63For the issues involved in multidimensional mechanism design see, for instance, Armstrong (1996) and Rochet and
Chone (1998).
64For an excellent treatment of the principal-agent model see Laﬀont and Martimort (2002).
29left for future research.
8 Appendix
8.1 Appendix A
Ignoring (5) the ﬁrst order conditions for the derivation of the optimal revelation mechanism are
µ1 = λ2 + sλ (28)
λ2 =( 1 − s)λ − µ2 (29)
s[B0(q1) − λaθ1]=−λ2a∆θ + µ1(1 − a)θ1 (30)
(1 − s)[B0(q2) − λaθ2]=µ2(1 − a)θ2, (31)
where µ1 is the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier of the low-cost agency’s administrative constraint, µ2 is the
Kuhn-Tucker multiplier of the high-cost agency’s administrative constraint and λ2 is the the Kuhn-
Tucker multiplier of the low-cost agency’s incentive-compatibility constraint. Moreover, we have the
following complementary-slackness conditions
µ1 ≥ 0,U 1 − (1 − a)θ1q1 ≥ 0,µ 1[U1 − (1 − a)θ1q1]=0 , (32)
µ2 ≥ 0,U 2 − (1 − a)θ2q2 ≥ 0,µ 2[U2 − (1 − a)θ2q2]=0 , (33)
λ2 ≥ 0,U 2 − U1 + a∆θq1 ≥ 0,λ2[U2 − U1 + a∆θq1]=0 . (34)
First, note that µ1 > 0 and thus U1 =( 1− a)θ1q1. Second note that λ2 > 0. If λ2 =0then
the above conditions imply that µ2 > 0,U 2 =( 1− a)θ2q2 and qi = qo
i for any i =1 ,2, which violates




1 / ∈ [a∗−a
1−a ,
a∗(1−a)
1−aa∗ ]. Therefore, λ2 > 0 and U2 = U1 − a∆θq1.
Now suppose that µ2 =0 . Then the necessary conditions imply that:
µ1 = λ (35)
λ2 =( 1 − s)λ (36)
B0(q1)=λθ1(





But, due to a∗ >a ,w eh a v eaθ2 < θ1(
1−(1−s) a
a∗
s ) and thus q2 >q 1 which violates U2 ≥ (1 − a)θ2q2,
given that U1 =( 1− a)θ1q1 and U2 = U1 − a∆θq1. Thus µ2 > 0 and U2 =( 1− a)θ2q2.
308.2 Appendix B
Ignoring (6) the ﬁrst order conditions for the derivation of the optimal revelation mechanism are
µ2 = λ1 +( 1− s)λ (39)
λ1 = sλ − µ1 (40)
s[B0(q1) − λaθ1]=µ1(1 − a)θ1 (41)
(1 − s)[B0(q2) − λaθ2]=λ1a∆θ + µ2(1 − a)θ2, (42)
where µ1 is the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier of the low-cost agency’s administrative constraint, µ2 is the
Kuhn-Tucker multiplier of the high-cost agency’s administrative constraint and λ1 is the the Kuhn-
Tucker multiplier of the high-cost agency’s incentive-compatibility constraint. Moreover, we have the
following complementary-slackness conditions
µ1 ≥ 0,U 1 − (1 − a)θ1q1 ≥ 0,µ 1[U1 − (1 − a)θ1q1]=0 , (43)
µ2 ≥ 0,U 2 − (1 − a)θ2q2 ≥ 0,µ 2[U2 − (1 − a)θ2q2]=0 , (44)
λ1 ≥ 0,U 1 − U2 − a∆θq2 ≥ 0,λ2[U1 − U2 − a∆θq2]=0 . (45)
First, note that µ2 > 0 and thus U2 =( 1− a)θ2q2. Second note that λ1 > 0. If λ1 =0then
the above conditions imply that µ1 > 0,U 1 =( 1− a)θ1q1 and qi = qo
i for any i =1 ,2, which violates




1 / ∈ [a∗−a
1−a ,
a∗(1−a)
1−aa∗ ]. Therefore, λ1 > 0 and U1 = U2 + a∆θq2. This











1 − aa∗ q1. (47)
If ˆ q2(a) ≥
a∗(1−a)
1−aa∗ ˆ q1(a) we can ignore the (low-cost agency’s administrative) constraint. The
unconstraint maximum is q∗
i (a)=ˆ qi(a) > 0, with the inequality following from ˆ q1(a) >q o
1(a) > 0 and
ˆ q2(a) ≥
a∗(1−a)
1−aa∗ ˆ q1(a). Thus, the constraint is not violated at this solution.
Suppose now that ˆ q2(a) <
a∗(1−a)
1−aa∗ ˆ q1(a). It follows then that the constraint is binding. To see this
note ﬁrst that the ﬁrst order conditions with respect to q1 and q2 are
s[B0(q1) − λaθ1]=µ1
a∗(1 − a)
1 − aa∗ (48)
(1 − s)[B0(q2) − λθ2
1 − saa∗
1 − s
]+µ1 =0 , (49)
31where µ1 is the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier of the above constraint. If µ1 =0the above conditions imply
that qi =ˆ qi(a) for any i =1 ,2. Given ˆ q2(a) <
a∗(1−a)
1−aa∗ ˆ q1(a) the constraint is violated. Hence, µ1 > 0.
Eliminating µ1 from the above conditions we then have directly that q∗
i (a)=¯ qi(x) > 0 with x =
a∗(1−a)
1−aa∗ .
(Note that, due to ˆ q1(a) > 0,i fˆ q2(a) ≥
a∗(1−a)
1−aa∗ ˆ q1(a) then B0(0) > λθ2
1−saa∗
1−s . Note also that
B0(0) ≤ λθ2
1−saa∗
1−s implies ˆ q2(a) <
a∗(1−a)
1−aa∗ ˆ q1(a). In general, however, we may also have that ˆ q2(a) <
a
∗(1−a)




Consider the range of parameters for which the convergence contract is relevant and hence a<a ∗.
Recall that the convergence contract with unconstrained resources is such that U2 = U1 − a∆θq1 and
Ui =( 1− a)θiqi for any i =1 ,2. Combining these conditions we have that q2 = a
∗−a
1−a q1. Moreover we
have that the production plan under this contract is {¯ q1(x), ¯ q2(x)} with x = a∗−a
1−a . Recall also that 0 <
qo
2 < ¯ q2(x) < ¯ q1(x) <q o
1 <q 1
max.
Given that the low-cost agency operates at minimum cost we have directly that the corresponding
resource constraint is not violated. Note now that the high-cost agency’s resource constraint when
U2 = U1 − a∆θq1 and U1 =( 1− a)θ1q1 can be re-written as q1 ≤ 1
a∗−a(q2
max − aq2). Thus, if the high-
cost agency’s resource constraint is violated at the convergence contract we derived in Section 4 it must
be that ¯ q1(x) > 1
a∗−a(q2













which is a contradiction.
Suppose then that a ∈ (0,a ∗) and ¯ q1(x) ≥ 1
a∗−a(q2
max−a¯ q2(x)). Given that ¯ q2(x) < ¯ q1(x) we have
that it must also be that ¯ q1(x) > 1
a∗−a(q2
max −a¯ q1(x)) and thereby ¯ q1(x) >q 2
max/a∗. The latter implies
that ¯ q1(x) >q 1
max >q o
1 which is a contradiction. Accordingly, the introduction of limited resources does





1−a : the agency, regardless of its cost-type,
does not exhaust or absorb more than the available resources.
8.5 Appendix E
Ignoring (6) and (22) the ﬁrst order conditions for the derivation of the optimal revelation mechanism
are
µ2 = λ1 +( 1− s)λ (50)
λ1 = sλ − µ1 + κ1 (51)
s[B0(q1) − λaθ1]=µ1(1 − a)θ1 + κ1aθ1 (52)
(1 − s)[B0(q2) − λaθ2]=λ1a∆θ + µ2(1 − a)θ2, (53)
32where µ1 and κ1 are the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers of the low-cost agency’s administrative and resource
constraints, respectively, µ2 is the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier of the high-cost agency’s administrative
constraint and λ1 is the the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier of the high-cost agency’s incentive-compatibility
constraint. Moreover, we have the following complementary-slackness conditions
µ1 ≥ 0,U 1 − (1 − a)θ1q1 ≥ 0,µ 1[U1 − (1 − a)θ1q1]=0 , (54)
µ2 ≥ 0,U 2 − (1 − a)θ2q2 ≥ 0,µ 2[U2 − (1 − a)θ2q2]=0 , (55)
λ1 ≥ 0,U 1 − U2 − a∆θq2 ≥ 0,λ2[U1 − U2 − a∆θq2]=0 , (56)
κ1 ≥ 0,R max − aθ1q1 − U1 ≥ 0,κ1[Rmax − aθ1q1 − U1]=0 . (57)
First, note that µ2 > 0 and thus U2 =( 1− a)θ2q2. Second note that λ1 > 0. If λ1 =0then
the above conditions imply that µ1 > 0,U 1 =( 1− a)θ1q1 and, given qo
i <q i
max,t h a tqi = qo
i for any




1 / ∈ [a∗−a
1−a ,
a∗(1−a)
1−aa∗ ]. Therefore, λ1 > 0 and
U1 = U2+a∆θq2. This condition and U2 =( 1 −a)θ2q2 imply that U1 ≥ (1−a)θ1q1 and U1 ≤ Rmax−aθ1q1
can be re-written as q2 ≥
a
∗(1−a)
1−aa∗ q1 and q2 ≤ a∗
1−aa∗(q1













max − aq1). (60)




max − aˇ q1(a)) (61)
s[B0(ˇ q1(a)) − aλθ1]





1 − aa∗. (62)
Note that if ˆ q2(a) > a∗
1−aa∗(q1
max−aˆ q1(a)) then ˇ qi(a) < ˆ qi(a) for any i =1 ,2, and vice versa. Recall now
that ˆ q2(a) <q o
2 <q 2
max. Accordingly, if ˆ q2(a) > a∗
1−aa∗(q1
max − aˆ q1(a)) we also have that ˇ q2(a) <q 2
max.
Note also that ˇ q2(a) >
a∗(1−a)
1−aa∗ ˇ q1(a) imply that ˇ q1(a) <q 1
max, and vice versa. We now turn to the
characterisation of the above problem’s solution.
(I) Consider, ﬁrst, the case of a ∈ (0,1), ˆ q2(a) > a
∗
1−aa∗(q1




1−aa∗ ˇ q1(a), and either ˆ q2(a) ≥
a∗(1−a)
1−aa∗ ˆ q1(a) or ˆ q2(a) <
a∗(1−a)
1−aa∗ ˆ q1(a) and ¯ q2(x) > a∗
1−aa∗(q1
max−
a¯ q1(x)) with x =
a∗(1−a)
1−aa∗ . It turns out that we can ignore the ﬁrst constraint. By doing so we clearly
have that 0 <q i = ˇ qi(x) < ˆ qi(a), for any i =1 ,2. Observe that ˇ q2(x) < ˆ q2(a) <q o
2 <q 2
max. Note also
33that ˇ q2(a) <q 2
max and, by deﬁnition, ˇ q2(a)= a
∗
1−aa∗(q1
max − aˇ q1(a)) imply that ˇ q2(x) < ˇ q1(x). Thus,
the ignored constraints are satisﬁed. Note ﬁnally that ˇ q1(x) ∈ (q2
max,q 1
max] and that sgn{ˇ q1(x) − qo
1} is
ambiguous.
(II) Consider now the case of a ∈ (0,1), ˆ q2(a) > a∗
1−aa∗(q1
max − aˆ q1(a)), ˇ q2(a) <
a∗(1−a)
1−aa∗ ˇ q1(a),
and either ˆ q2(a) ≥
a
∗(1−a)
1−aa∗ ˆ q1(a) or ˆ q2(a) <
a
∗(1−a)
1−aa∗ ˆ q1(a) and ¯ q2(x) > a∗
1−aa∗(q1
max − a¯ q1(x)) with x =
a∗(1−a)
1−aa∗ .N o t et h a th e r ew eh a v eq1





1−aa∗ ˆ q1(a) we have that ¯ q2(x) > a∗
1−aa∗(q1
max − a¯ q1(x)) with x =
a∗(1−a)
1−aa∗ . In other words, if
a ∈ (0,1), ˆ q2(a) > a∗
1−aa∗(q1
max − aˆ q1(a)), ˇ q2(a) <
a∗(1−a)
1−aa∗ ˇ q1(a) and ˆ q2(a) 6=
a∗(1−a)
1−aa∗ ˆ q1(a) then we have
¯ q2(x) > a∗
1−aa∗(q1
max − a¯ q1(x)) with x =
a∗(1−a)
1−aa∗ .
The ﬁrst order conditions (FOCs) with respect to q1 and q2 are
s[B0(q1) − λaθ1]=µ1
a∗(1 − a)
1 − aa∗ + κ1
aa∗
1 − aa∗ (63)
(1 − s)[B0(q2) − λθ2
1 − saa∗
1 − s
]+µ1 = κ1. (64)
Note that µ1 > 0. If µ1 =0and κ1 =0then due to ˆ q2(a) > a∗
1−aa∗(q1
max − aˆ q1(a)) we have that the
third constraint is violated. If µ1 =0and κ1 > 0 then due to ˇ q2(a) <
a∗(1−a)
1−aa∗ ˇ q1(a) we have that the
ﬁrst constraint is violated. Thus µ1 > 0 and q2 =
a∗(1−a)
1−aa∗ q1. Note then that κ1 > 0. Suppose the
contrary, i.e. κ1 =0 . Then the above FOCs imply that qi =¯ q1(x) with x =
a∗(1−a)
1−aa∗ , and q1 < ˆ q1(a) and
q2 > ˆ q2(a). If ˆ q2(a) 6=
a∗(1−a)
1−aa∗ ˆ q1(a) the third constraint is violated due to ¯ q2(x) > a∗
1−aa∗(q1
max − a¯ q1(x))
with x =
a∗(1−a)
1−aa∗ . If ˆ q2(a)=
a∗(1−a)
1−aa∗ ˆ q1(a) then q2 >
a∗(1−a)




max−aq1). Accordingly, q1 = q1
max >q o







observe that q2 may be lower as well as higher than qo
2. In fact, sgn{qo
2−q2} = sgn{B0( 1−a
1−aa∗q2
max)−λθ2}.
(III) Consider, ﬁnally, the case of a ∈ (0,1), ˆ q2(a) ≤ a∗
1−aa∗(q1
max − aˆ q1(a)), ˆ q2(a) <
a∗(1−a)
1−aa∗ ˆ q1(a)
and ¯ q2(x) > a∗
1−aa∗(q1
max − a¯ q1(x)) with x =
a∗(1−a)
1−aa∗ . Note that here we have that ˇ q1(a) ≥ ˆ q1(a) and
ˇ q2(a) ≥ ˆ q2(a). Also it must be that ˆ q1(a) >q 1
max; otherwise ¯ q2(x) ≤ a∗
1−aa∗(q1
max − a¯ q1(x)). These rela-
tionships imply that ˇ q2(a) <
a∗(1−a)





1−aa∗ ˆ q1(a). But by deﬁnition ˇ q2(a)= a∗
1−aa∗(q1





1−aa∗ ˆ q1(a). Obviously, we arrived at a contradiction. Note then that due to ˆ q2(a) <
a∗(1−a)
1−aa∗ ˆ q1(a) we have that µ1 = κ1 =0cannot be the case. Also due to ¯ q2(x) > a∗
1−aa∗(q1
max − a¯ q1(x))
we have that µ1 > 0 and κ1 =0cannot be the case. Finally due to ˇ q2(a) <
a∗(1−a)
1−aa∗ ˇ q1(a) we have
that µ1 =0and κ1 > 0 cannot be the case. Accordingly, µ1 > 0, κ1 > 0 and thereby, as above,
q1 = q1
max >q o






max. Once again observe that sgn{qo
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